Atlantic Legal Foundation

“Atlantic legal has engaged an outside accounting firm to prepare its form 990. The draft form 990, prepared by the outside accounting firm, was provided to the chairman of the board and each director by electronic mail prior to filing with the irs. Each director was asked to review the draft form 990 and provide comments or questions. The officers of the foundation and the foundation's bookkeeping consultant were in frequent communication with the foundation's outside accountants and auditors by electronic mail and telephone to provide information, raise questions and provide comments on the form 990 prior to filing with the irs. After all questions and comments have been addressed, the final form 990 is prepared and submitted to the president of the foundation for his approval. It is then filed with the irs.”

“The foundation's conflict of interest policy is submitted annually to each board member, officer, advisor and staff member for review and signature. If it is determined that an actual conflict exists, the board member, officer, advisor or staff member will be notified and the matter will be investigated by the chairman. No board member will be allowed to vote or participate in board discussions about any matters involving the conflict until it is resolved.”

“The executive committee of atlantic legal's board without the participation of the president, determines the compensation of members of the senior staff, i.e., the president and the senior vice-presidents. The executive committee considers compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations for functionally comparable positions: comparable salaries of other employers of lawyers in the same geographical market and nationwide. This process was last undertaken in november 2019 and was documented in the minutes of the executive committee.”

“The foundation makes its form 990 available for public inspection as required under section 6104 of the internal revenue code. The return is posted on guidestar.org and other similar types of websites. In addition, the financial statements, articles of incorporation, form 990, form 1023, and by-laws are also available upon written request or by calling the organization directly.”

“Some of the principal areas on which we focused in 2019 were: constitutional issues atlantic legal foundation participates in important cases seeking to limit the expansive and capricious exercise of governmental power. The issues we have addressed include challenging the expansion of bureaucratic power, state and local attempts to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, combating limits on free speech in public fora and on college campuses, and opposing expansive assertions of u.s. Court jurisdiction over foreign entities and transactions. Sound science in litigation and regulation atlantic legal is the nation's preeminent public interest law firm advocating for the admissibility of sound medical and expert testimony in toxic tort, product liability and other litigation. Atlantic legal fights the admissibility of "junk" science, and fosters the use of sound science principles in judicial and regulatory proceedings. Our amicus briefs on behalf of numerous nobel laureates and many other prominent scientists were cited and relied on by the majority in the landmark daubert trilogy of u. S. Supreme court cases as well as cases in federal appellate courts and the highest courts of the most populous states, including california, florida, new york and pennsylvania. Issues impacting the market economy atlantic legal advocates against intrusive regulation of business and advocates for responsible corporate governance. The foundation was an early proponent of preservation of the attorney-client privilege against compulsory waiver of that essential protection where corporate misconduct has been asserted. It has challenged abuse of class action procedures and has strongly advocated for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Educational choice the atlantic legal foundation has long supported charter schools' laudable goals of reforming public education. The foundation has supported the charter school community by providing unique labor law guidance to school leadership through a series of books entitled "leveling the playing field," addressing the difficult area of union organizing, collective bargaining, and related employee rights at charter schools. These issues have historically been determined by the individual states' charter school legislation and public sector labor law, since all charter schools are public schools, as defined by the various state statutes. The leveling series raised the question of whether the national labor relations act (nlra), and not state law, should have jurisdiction over charter schools, despite their states' characterization as "public schools." although there is variation from state to state, in most instances, charter schools are created by and administered by private entities, although funded publicly and subject to state regulation. A few years after these publications, the national labor relations board (nlrb) began to assert federal labor law jurisdiction over charter schools in various states. There are myriad differences between the labor laws of the individual states and that of the nlra. Some states have no collective bargaining rights for teachers. Some have limited rights. Some allow employees to vote on unionization through secret ballot elections. Others do not. It is amply clear that no state labor law provides protections and rights to employees as broadly as the nlra. The laws of some states tilt toward the benefit of the employers, others, toward the unions. As a result, charter school employers around the country have their own preferences. In some cases, unions sought nlrb jurisdiction. In others, employers sought it. As the nlrb has added more states to its jurisdictions, interested parties on both sides have raised their concerns. Because the nlrb issues decisions on a case by case basis, its extension of jurisdiction over charter schools has been limited to those schools in which a union, employees, or an employer has brought a case. The legal analysis utilized by the board det”

“Foundation was interested in being heard on this subject. The foundation consulted with state and national charter school groups. Ultimately, the alf declined to file an amicus brief because schools and charter school associations the foundation supports are on both sides of the matter, often depending upon where they are located. The school and its employees argued that although the board has the statutory authority to withdraw jurisdiction, there was no evidence supporting such an unprecedented abandonment of employee rights. Illustrated by a partial list of the scores of cases in which the nlrb, its regional offices, its administrative law judges, and its general counsel processed charges and petitions, the school asked the board how it could now reverse course and advice thousands of employees that they no longer enjoyed the protections of the nlra. On march 25, 2020, the nlrb issued its decision, determining not to exercise is discretion to decline jurisdiction over charter schools as a class." kipp academy charter school, 368 nlrb no. 48. In the analysis, the board appears satisfied to allow the status quo to remain. It seems likely that board jurisdiction will continue to be extended. But, there are still many states' laws which have not been subject to the board's analysis. Charter school operations in these states in which the board has affirmatively found jurisdiction should be aware of employers' rights and responsibilities under the law which may significantly differ from state law. Employers in states not yet reviewed by the nlrb should be aware of the possibility that the state law they have operated under may change without notice federal law generally provides a greater degree of protections to employees than states' public sector labor laws. The atlantic legal foundation will continue to monitor the legal landscape for charter schools, and where appropriate, will extend support. Cases in 2019 the foundation's principal legal activity consists of filing amicus briefs in the united states supreme court, federal appellate courts, and the highest courts of several key states. In 2019 we filed briefs in a number of significant cases involving a variety of critical issues and commenced work on other cases in which we filed briefs in 2020. In addition to the cases in which we filed briefs, the foundation's staff spends substantial time researching, analyzing and presenting to the foundation's board numerous cases in which we ultimately decide not to participate. Our cases come to us in numerous ways: requests from law firms, principally law firms with established supreme court practices, to support them either on the merits or at the petition stage; requests directly from potential amicus clients, including trade associations, civic associations, think tanks, and individuals or groups of individuals; perusal of legal, scientific and industry periodicals and online blogs that report on legal matters of interest to that trade or profession; bulletins and "amicus conference calls" from the heritage foundation and similar groups; ad hoc discussions with other lawyers in public interest law firms and in private practice; and consultations with members of atlantic legal's board of directors and advisory council. The very nature of these sources tends to apprise us of current "hot" issues of importance. Once a case comes to the attention of atlantic legal's staff, it is discussed with either the board or the executive committee of the board, depending on the time constraints. Compelled speech - whether retail stores can be required to post signs warning customers of the "dangers" of cell phones, when the fcc (which by federal law has supervisory jurisdiction over cellular devices) and the consensus of relevant scientific organizations has found no emission of dangerous levels of ionizing radiation by cell phones. This case involves both free speech issues and sound science issues. Arbitration of disputes - despite a clear s”

“Parties to settle a case, while "making everyone happy." in the typical cy pres case, only a small portion of the settlement fund involves claims by actual class members or funds that can't be distributed because the class members entitled to payment cannot be located. In such instances the "tail" of the settlement fund is distributed to one or more charitable organizations that have some tenuous relationship to the subject matter of the case. In numerous instances, the recipient is a college or law school that happens to be the alma mater of the plaintiff class's lawyer(s), the defendants' lawyer(s), and/or the judge. All the lawyers come out looking generous and philanthropic (with other people's money); but at least the plaintiff class collectively gets a substantial payout. In this case, the actual injured party got nothing, not even a coupon to get a discount on some future purchase from the wrong-doer. Atlantic legal and the center for constitutional litigation of the claremont institute jointly filed an amicus brief in the u.s. Supreme court, in support of petitioners in frank v. Gaos. In their merits stage challenge to the approval by the lower federal courts, including the ninth circuit, of a cy pres award settlement of a class action that provided that the whole of the settlement fund (net of attorneys' fees and administration costs) was to be paid to advocacy groups; not a penny was paid to members of the class, which consisted of 130 million users of google, whose privacy was violated. We argued that the cy pres only settlement also violates the first amendment rights of the unnamed class members. By directing the settlement funds away from members of the injured plaintiff class to advocacy groups such as aarp, inc. And the world privacy forum, the courts below forced the plaintiff class to provide financial support to organizations with which they may not agree, in violation of the first amendment's prohibition on compelled speech. Compelling the plaintiff class to subsidize the speech of others raises similar concerns to compelled speech, janus v. Afscme, 138 s. Ct. At 2464 (2018), decided at the end of october 2017 term of the court, and compelling individuals to speak a particular message "violates [a] cardinal constitutional command," id.; see nifla v. Becerra, 585 u.s. 138 s.ct. 2361 (2018). We also argued that the class members have no standing because the individuals who allegedly suffered harm received no relief and are barred from seeking relief from similar conduct in the future; thus the court cannot redress the alleged injury, further, the cy pres award recipients in this case have no standing because in fact they have not suffered any injury and consequently the "case or controversy" requirements of article iii have not been met. The supreme court, agreeing with an argument we made, held that the lower courts did not address the court's opinion in spokeo, inc. V. Robins (2016), which was issued after briefing in the case was complete but prior to the ninth circuit's decision. The court determined that there were substantial questions about whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue in light spokeo. Because the court is one "of review, not of first view," in a per curiam opinion the court vacated the decision of the ninth circuit approving a cy pres only class action settlement and remanded the case for the resolution of these questions. Justice thomas, in dissent, would have reached the merits and would have reversed the ninth circuit's class certification and class settlement orders because the class members received no damages or other form of meaningful relief. Although the court punted on deciding the fairness of google's $8.5 million cy pres privacy deal that steered funds to third parties instead of class members, justice thomas' unequivocal criticism of the arrangement may be a sign that the high court may soon curtail the practice. Arbitration agreements henry schein, inc., et al.”

“California courts to disfavor arbitration agreements in violation of the faa and supreme court precedent. In particular, the questions presented focus on whether california's unique procedural hurdles for arbitrating statutory employment law claims, as well as california's arbitration specific approach to severability, are preempted by the faa under at&t mobility llc v. Concepcion, 563 u.s. 333 (2011), and similar cases. California courts have developed a highly restrictive approach to enforcing arbitration agreements respecting state statutory claims. See armendariz v. Found. Psych healthcare, 24 cal. 4th 83, 113 21 (2000) (setting forth five "minimum requirements for the lawful arbitration of such rights, and invoking "unconscionability" doctrine to strike arbitration provisions that are "unfairly one sided"). Although armendariz was decided before concepcion, the california court of appeal has continued to impose arbitration specific obstacles to the enforcement of arbitration provisions in employment contexts, and the california supreme court has declined to correct that error. See, e.g., sanchez v. Valencia holding co., llc, 61 cal. 4th 899 (2015); sonic calabasas a, inc. V. Moreno, 57 cal. 4th 1109 (2013). In addition, the severability rule applied by california courts is itself uniquely hostile to arbitration contracts. California courts will invalidate an entire agreement to arbitrate based only upon the presence of more than one unconscionable term. See armendariz, 24 cal. 4th at 121 27. No such rule applies to contracts generally in california. California's approach to severability uniquely disfavors arbitration agreements contrary to the mandate of the faa. The other question - whether california's armendariz "minimum requirements and arbitration specific unconscionability doctrine survive faa preemption raises an issue on which the supreme court has recently and repeatedly focused its attention. The court has recently granted several petitions challenging state courts' refusal to heed faa preemption. See kindred nursing ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 s. Ct. 1421 (2017); nitro lift techs., l.l.c. V. Howard, 568 u.s. 17 (2012); marmet health care ctr., inc. V. Brown, 565 u.s. 530 (2012); kpmg llp v. Cocchi 565 u.s. 18 (2011). California courts in particular have produced a disproportionate number of these arbitration hostile decisions, making this issue a strong candidate for reversal. See, e.g., directv, inc. V. Imburgia, 136 s. Ct. 463 (2015); preston v. Ferrer, 552 u.s. 346 (2008). Respondent has asked for and has been granted additional time to file her response, and the petition is sub judice. Although the certiorari process is inherently unpredictable, we think there is a reasonable chance the supreme court will grant review in this case. For one thing, the court recently granted certiorari in mhn government services, inc. V. Zaborowski, which raised the question of whether california's arbitration only severability rule is preempted by the faa; the court did not decide the question because the case settled in april 2016, before oral argument was held. See 136 s. Ct. 1539 (2016). There is no reason to think that question has become any less "cert-worthy" over the past three years (the issue has not been squarely presented since mhn became moot). Separation of powers - judicial deference to administrative interpretation. Kisor v. Wilkie - u.s. Supreme court. Merits. Decided june 26, 2019. Kisor v. Wilkie, is a veteran's benefit case involving a u. S. Marine who sought retroactive benefits for his service-related ptsd. The case hinged on the veterans administration's interpretation of the applicable federal regulations. The court granted review of the question whether the court should overrule auer v. Robbins and bowles v. Seminole rock and sand co. Auer and seminole rock "direct courts to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation." "auer deference and "chevron deference" are”

“Alleging they have asbestosis, lung cancer or mesothelioma. Early asbestos lawsuits targeted producers of asbestos and asbestos containing products, which numbered in the hundreds (in 1982, about 300 such companies). However, as these defendants declared bankruptcy (and the direct producers established "trust funds" to compensate victims), waves of new lawsuits spread to companies farther removed from direct production. The most common "deep pocket" defendants are manufacturers of machinery that used asbestos as insulating, gasket or "friction" material (such as automobile brakes and clutches) or construction material that used materials that had an incidental amount of asbestos (such as wall board, joint compound, cement blocks, plaster, etc.). New york county supreme court (new york state's trial court of general jurisdiction) in juni v. A.o. Smith water products set aside a jury verdict totaling $11 million awarded against ford motor company in favor of a motor vehicle mechanic who had died from mesothelioma. The trial court's opinion is a thorough and clear explication of the clash between experts' hypotheses, and "good" science. It exposed the tensions between what the plaintiff's experts claimed and what new york's legal standards require for reliable and admissible expert testimony. The trial court rejected" the "single fiber" theory, which is based on the notion that a "single fiber" of any type of asbestos causes disease cumulatively and, therefore, is a "substantial factor" in causing the disease. Single fiber testimony has been rejected by a growing number of appellate courts outside new york. The trial court analyzed plaintiff's expert testimony and held that the reliability of these opinions and the underlying methodologies were governed by the admissibility standards articulated in parker v. Mobil oil corp. And cornell v. 360 w. 51st st. Realty. If "novel" scientific evidence is involved, the court applies the "general acceptance" test articulated in frye v. United states (d.c. Cir. 1924) to determine "whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally." if the answer is "no," the testimony must be excluded. If the answer is "yes," the proponent of the novel scientific testimony has survived the threshold test but still has to get past the admissibility "gate and the proffered scientific evidence must then meet a second, "foundational reliability" inquiry. This second admissibility standard applies to all expert testimony, not just novel scientific evidence. In parker, the court said the frye inquiry is "separate and distinct from the admissibility question applied to all evidence whether there is a proper foundation to determine whether the accepted methods were appropriately employed in a particular case." parker declared that the focus moves "from the general reliability concerns of frye to the specific reliability of the procedures followed to generate the evidence proffered and whether they establish a foundation for the reception of evidence at trial." plaintiff's general causation expert testified that all instances of asbestos exposure are "viewed as a whole," cumulatively contributing to and causing the illness. He stated that "every part of that exposure" acts as a contributing factor and no exposure can be discounted, no matter how remote the occurrence, as "it's the cumulative exposure that matters." he also opined that chrysotile fibers in friction products (e.g., brakes, clutches and gaskets) can cause mesothelioma. Markowitz acknowledged that 21 of 22 epidemiological studies on workers with friction products "yielded no evidence of an increased risk of developing an asbestos related disease," but he relied on industrial hygiene studies that involved factory workers who produced friction products from raw asbestos. Plaintiff's expert on specific causation, testified that decedent's cumulative asbestos exposures ca”

“Prominent scientists who are experts in fields relevant to medical causation. In that brief we argued that the "cumulative exposure" theory is inconsistent with appropriate scientific inquiry as to medical causation, which requires that both "general causation" (that a particular substance can cause the disease which injured the plaintiff) and "specific causation" (that the intensity, duration and dosage of the substance to which the plaintiff was exposed has been shown to cause the disease in question. This is especially essential where persons are exposed to "background" levels of the accused substance and where the plaintiff has been exposed to a particular substance from multiple sources.”

“Uncollected pledges -1,500.”

“The foundation is governed by a 27 member board of directors, 26 of whom are independent directors. The independent directors serve without compensation. The board ordinarily meets 3 times a year. Between board meetings, the foundation is directed by an executive committee of the board of directors, consisting of 10 directors, 9 of whom are independent directors. The 9 independent members of the executive committee also act as the audit committee, responsible for the oversight of the audit of financial statements and selection of an independent outside accountant/auditor. This process has not changed from the prior year.”