Atlantic Legal Foundation

“Atlantic legal has engaged an outside accounting firm to prepare its form 990. The draft form 990, prepared by the outside accounting firm, was provided to the chairman of the board and each director by electronic mail prior to filing with the irs. Each director was asked to review the draft form 990 and provide comments or questions. The officers of the foundation and the foundation's bookkeeping consultant were in frequent communication with the foundation's outside accountants and auditors by electronic mail and telephone to provide information, raise questions and provide comments on the form 990 prior to filing with the irs. After all questions and comments have been addressed, the final form 990 is prepared and submitted to the president of the foundation for his approval and signature. It is then filed with the irs.”

“The foundation's conflict of interest policy is submitted annually to each board member, advisor and staff member for review and signature. If it is determined that an actual conflict exists, the board member, advisor or staff member will be notified and the matter will be investigated by the chairman. No board member will be allowed to vote or participate in board discussions about any matters involving the conflict until it is resolved.”

“The executive committee of atlantic legal's board without the participation of the president, determines the compensation of members of the senior staff, i.e., the president and the executive vice president. The executive committee considers comparable salaries of other employers of lawyers in the same geographical market and nationwide. This process was last undertaken in november 2017 and was documented in the minutes of the executive committee.”

“The foundation makes its form 990 available for public inspection as required under section 6104 of the internal revenue code. The return is posted on guidestar.org and other similar types of websites. In addition, the financial statements, articles of incorporation, form 990, form 1023, and by-laws are also available upon written request or by calling the organization directly.”

“Atlantic legal provides legal representation and counsel, without fee, to individuals, including scientists, educators, and prominent public servants, corporations, trade associations, and other groups. Some of the principal areas on which we focus are: constitutional law - first amendment - "agency fees and freedom of association and speech. Whether government employees can be forced to pay union "agency fees" which are used, in part, to fund labor union advocacy for policies with which many government workers disagree. In the u.s. Supreme court on the merits. Janus v. Afscme, no. 16-1466 and hill v. Seiu, no. 16-1480 - u.s. Supreme court. These are two related cases, both brought by the national right to work legal foundation, challenging aspects of the relationship between the state of illinois and home care providers and child care providers and public employee unions designated by the state as exclusive representatives of home care providers and child care providers in their dealings with the state and the collection of fees by the public employee unions. These are issues which the court has addressed and we have addressed in amicus briefs over the last few years and in knox v. Seiu, local 1000, 567 u.s. 298 (2012) and harris v. Quinn, 134s. Ct. 2618 (2014), and which we hoped the court would resolve in friedrichs v. California teachers' association, 136 s. Ct. 1083 (2016), in which certiorari was granted, the case was fully briefed and argued, but the judgment of the u.s. Court of appeals for the ninth circuit ruling for the union was affirmed exactly one year ago by an equally divided court, justice scalia having died after oral argument, but before a decision on the merits. Janus presents the same question presented in friedrichs: should abood be overruled and public-sector agency fee arrangements declared unconstitutional under the first amendment? This case was argued in february 2018, and a decision is expected before the court adjourns in june 2018.”

“Compelled speech ctia v. City of berkeley, no. 17-976, u. S. Supreme court, on petition for certiorari. The question in this case is whether cell phone stores can be required to post signs warning customers of the "dangers" of cell phones. We filed an amicus brief on behalf of the national association of manufacturers in support of the petition for review by ctia, the trade association of the cell phone industry. The primary legal issue is whether under the first amendment a local government can compel private persons to speak words that convey thoughts the speaker does not believe or agree with. This is especially the case when the speech involves controversial or as in this case untrue facts (the federal communications commission and a consensus of relevant scientific organizations has found that cell phones do not emit dangerous levels of ionizing radiation). This case involves both free speech issues and sound science issues. We expect a decision on ctia's petition before the court recesses in june.”

“Arbitration of disputes. Enforceability of arbitration clauses employment contracts national labor relations act epic systems corp. V. Lewis, no. 15-2997, ernst & young v. Morris, no. 16-300, nlrb v. Murphy oil, no. 16-307. U.s. Supreme court on the merits. In january 2017, the supreme court granted certiorari review in three cases to resolve a circuit split arising from contrary conclusions drawn recently by several circuits on whether class and collective action waivers in arbitration clauses of employment agreements violate the national labor relations act or whether the federal arbitration act trumps the nlra. Class-action waivers in employment agreements have been struck down by the ninth and seventh circuits, but upheld by the second, fifth and eighth circuits. We filed an amicus brief, in which we argued that the supreme court has long held that the federal arbitration act establishes a congressional policy strongly favoring arbitration, and that overcoming that strong presumption requires a clear legislative statement that some other identified congressional policy overrides the arbitration act. Further, the court has consistently recognized that arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms and the obligation to "rigorously enforce" arbitration agreements includes terms requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes individually, rather than on a class or collective basis. The cases were argued together in the very first session of the court's october 2017 term. They were decided in may 2018. The u.s. Supreme court ruled on may 21, 2018, in a 5 - 4 decision, that employment agreements requiring employees to waive their rights to pursue class action claims are enforceable, rejecting the national labor relations board's ruling that class waivers violate federal labor law. Justice neil gorsuch, joined by chief justice john robert sand justices anthony kennedy, clarence thomas and samuel alito, held that mandatory arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms under the federal arbitration act, even if those terms mandate individual arbitration and prohibit collective litigation or collective arbitration. The supreme court ruled that employers can force workers to sign such waivers as a condition of employment. The 5 - 4 decision, breaking along the court's conservative-liberal divide, mirrored the broader debate in the weight each faction gave to conflicting federal statutes and the congressional priorities they reflected. Business groups have championed individualized arbitration as an efficient means to resolve disputes and deter frivolous claims that take longer and cost more to resolve if brought in court as a class action. Consumer and labor organizations contend the private, often confidential, arbitration system is stacked against individuals and can hide from public scrutiny systemic misconduct by a company or industry.”

“Admissibility of expert testimony delisle v. Crane co., florida supreme court, no. Sc16-2182, is an asbestos personal injury case that was tried to verdict against crane co., a maker of (among other things) gaskets used in industrial pumps and r.j. Reynolds tobacco company, a cigarette manufacturer. The trial resulted in an $8 million verdict for plaintiff, with 16% of the fault allocated to crane co., 44% to r.j. Reynolds, and the remaining 40% to two other defendants. Crane co. Appealed the verdict, challenging the admissibility and legal sufficiency of the "every exposure" causation testimony presented by plaintiff's expert medical witness. The florida district court of appeal vacated the judgment and ordered entry of a directed verdict for crane co., finding that plaintiff's expert testimony was inadmissible under the daubert standard for admissibility, which the florida legislature adopted in 2013 through an amendment to the florida evidence code. R.j. Reynolds appealed on a similar ground (challenging the admissibility of the testimony of several other plaintiff's experts), and the district court of appeal, again applying daubert, reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial for r.j. Reynolds. The first issue on appeal is whether the district court of appeal properly applied daubert, or whether, it should have applied the (less stringent) frye-like standards for admissibility of expert testimony that applied in florida prior to 2013. Plaintiff argues that the legislative adoption of daubert violated the principle of separation of powers inherent in article v, section 2(a) of the florida constitution,which commits to the supreme court the power to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts." the florida supreme court declined to adopt the section of the evidence code amended in 2013 to include the daubert standard in the context of a rule-adoption proceeding. The florida supreme court stated that it would not consider the constitutionality of that enactment in the context of a proceeding to consider new evidentiary rules, but expressed "concerns" regarding the constitutionality of the legislature's action that it could only resolve in the context of a pending adversarial appeal. See crane co. V. Delisle, 206 so.3d 94 (fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). The substantive issue in the case is whether the "cumulative exposure" theory of causation advanced by plaintiffs as a substitute for their generally discredited "single fiber" theory is a scientifically and legally credible theory of causation that will support a finding of liability. In delisle, plaintiff's expert's testimony that there is "no known safe level" of asbestos is problematic and the trial court properly excluded the testimony of plaintiff's causation expert because that testimony was not based on accepted scientific methodology and was not reliable because the expert's theory is inconsistent with generally accepted scientific principles: (i) plaintiff's causation expert ignored the need to establish both general causation and specific causation, (ii) the epidemiology studies supporting general causation for the type of asbestos used in crane co.'s products are not consistent and in some studies no excess occurrence of mesothelioma is reported, while for other commercially used types of asbestos the epidemiology studies consistently report a significant occurrence of mesothelioma; (iii) the expert had no evidence of the intensity, frequency or duration of mr. Delisle's exposure and thus could not establish specific causation; (iv) the expert failed to consider exposure to, and carcinogenicity of different asbestos types; and (v) differential diagnosis, the method the expert used to conclude that mr. Delisle's disease was caused by exposure to asbestos in crane's products, while a proper method for diagnosing disease and planning treatment, is not the proper method for determining causation. The evidence of general causation which for chrysotile is rath”

“In our brief we argued that the california courts' exercise of jurisdiction over claims by non-resident plaintiffs against a non-resident defendant violated the defendant's due process rights. As we argued, the majority of the california supreme court utilized a "hybrid" kind of jurisdiction that fits neither category and is amorphous, unpredictable, and too uncertain to meet due process requirements. It was based on a mix of the company's ties to california (such as maintaining research facilities in the state), but which had no, or only tenuous, connection to the transactions which gave rise to the claims in the lawsuit. The due process clause permits a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant only when the plaintiff's claims "arise out of or relate to" the defendant's forum activities. Burger king corp. V. Rudzewicz, 471 u.s. 462, 472 (1985) (citation omitted). A state's exercise of jurisdiction comports with federal due process if the nonresident defendant has "minimum contacts" with the state and the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" walden v. Fiore, 134 s. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (quoting int'l shoe co. V. Washington, 326 u.s. 310, 316 (1945)). Due process requirements are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The "minimum contacts" calculus focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, and requires determining that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum. When a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit in which plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum state, the state is exercising "specific jurisdiction" over the defendant. The court's specific jurisdiction jurisprudence teaches that the existence or absence of a causal link between defendant's contacts with the state and plaintiff's claimed injury is essential in determining whether jurisdiction exists. The california supreme court's analysis and holding on specific jurisdiction are fatally flawed. That court ignored the consistent teaching of the supreme court on the nature of contacts that can underpin the assertion of specific jurisdiction. The california court identified nothing bristol-myers did in the state that gave rise to the claims in their cases. To establish specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must identify acts connecting the defendant's actions in california with the plaintiff's claims. The california supreme court had found that specific jurisdiction was present without identifying any adequate link between the state and the nonresidents' claims. The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested that prescription medication in california, and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents, did not allow the state to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents' claims. We argued that the california decision confuses principles of general jurisdiction (which it conceded were not satisfied) with "specific jurisdiction" to adjudicate a particular case. General jurisdiction exists based on "contacts [with] no apparent relationship to the [injury] that gave rise to the suit, and then only when they are sufficiently "continuous and systematic" to render the defendant "at home." daimler ag v. Bauman, 134 s. Ct. 746, 757 (2014). The california supreme court's "sliding scale" approach is really a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction and under which the strength of the requisite connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims. That approach cannot be squared with the court's general jurisdic”

“Efforts to organize charter school teachers and other employees are likely to have a significant impact on the flexibility the school needs to meet its charter responsibilities, and charter administrators need to know how to react when the union seeks to represent employees. Charter boards and administrators are well advised to seek counsel from firms that practice regularly in this area. Whatever choices charter communities make to best serve their students, we believe that those choices must be made with the benefit of full information, transparent communication, and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of charter boards, leaders, teachers, and all others engaged in each charter's community. The foundation's leveling the playing field monographs are designed to answer important questions about the unionization process, what charter leaders must do to foster positive labor relations, and where and how to seek help to improve operational quality. New editions of state-specific versions of leveling the playing field, starting with california (released in june of 2017), are prompted by significant developments in labor law as applied to charters. Beginning in 2012, and continuing to now, the national labor relations board has taken jurisdiction over individual charter schools in several states. Since 2012, the nlrb or its regional offices have asserted jurisdiction over charter schools, despite state or local law, at schools in illinois, pennsylvania, new york, michigan, louisiana, minnesota, ohio, texas and california. In one notable california decision, the nlrb denied a request for review and thus upheld a 2015 regional decision asserting nlrb jurisdiction over a california charter school which was duly organized under the california charter schools act; the nlrb processed the union's nlrb representation petition over the school's objections. The trend is toward nlrb jurisdiction over charter school union organizing. In no case since 2012 has the nlrb failed to take jurisdiction over a charter school when it was asked to do so. Teachers unions now recognize this jurisdictional tendency and may opt to initiate nlrb jurisdiction and voting procedures themselves. The foundation is planning to update other state versions of its leveling the playing field series. We are encouraged that the charter school movement is receiving accelerated impetus following the appointment of charter school advocate, betsy devoss, as u.s. Secretary of education. We anticipate that a new republican-appointed majority of the nlrb will perhaps follow a different path than its obama administration predecessor. The current department of education is certainly more charter-friendly, and charters may proliferate, creating even greater demand for leveling the playing field. Because of changes in the composition and policies of the national labor relations board and the federal department of education, there is a need to update the respective state-specific monographs in the series (and add additional states). We plan to publish new editions of several state-specific versions of leveling the playing field, following the california edition, to highlight significant developments in labor law as applied to charters.”

“The foundation is governed by a 28 member board of directors, 27 of whom are independent directors. The independent directors serve without compensation. The board ordinarily meets 3 times a year. Between board meetings, the foundation is directed by an executive committee of the board of directors, consisting of 10 directors, 9 of whom are independent directors. The 9 independent members of the executive committee also act as the audit committee, responsible for the oversight of the audit of financial statements and selection of an independent outside accountant/auditor. This process has not changed from the prior year.”